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Abstract—Social networks are known to be vulnerable to the so-called Sybil attack, in which an attacker maintains massive Sybils and
uses them to perform various malicious activities. Therefore, Sybil detection in social networks is a basic security research problem.
Structure-based methods have been shown to be promising at detecting Sybils. Existing structure-based methods can be classified
into two categories: Random Walk (RW)-based methods and Loop Belief Propagation (LBP)-based methods. RW-based methods
cannot leverage labeled Sybils and labeled benign users simultaneously, which limits their detection accuracy, and/or they are not
robust to noisy labels. LBP-based methods are not scalable, and they cannot guarantee convergence. In this work, we propose
SybilSCAR, a novel structure-based method to detect Sybils in social networks. SybilSCAR is Scalable, Convergent, Accurate, and
Robust to label noise. We first propose a framework to unify RW-based and LBP-based methods. Under our framework, these methods
can be viewed as iteratively applying a (different) local rule to every user, which propagates label information among a social graph.
Second, we design a new local rule, which SybilSCAR iteratively applies to every user to detect Sybils. We compare SybilSCAR with
state-of-the-art RW-based methods and LBP-based methods both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we show that, with proper
parameter settings, SybilSCAR has a tighter asymptotical bound on the number of Sybils that are falsely accepted into a social network
than existing structure-based methods. Empirically, we perform evaluation using both social networks with synthesized Sybils and a
large-scale Twitter dataset (41.7M nodes and 1.2B edges) with real Sybils, and our results show that 1) SybilSCAR is substantially
more accurate and more robust to label noise than state-of-the-art RW-based methods; and 2) SybilSCAR is more accurate and one
order of magnitude more scalable than state-of-the-art LBP-based methods.
Index Terms—Social networks, Sybil detection.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
SOCIAL networks are becoming more and more importantand essential platforms for people to interact with each
other, process information, and diffuse social influence, etc.
For example, Facebook was reported to have 1.65 billion
monthly active users as of April 2016 [1], and it has be-
come the third most visited website worldwide, just next
to Google.com and YouTube.com, according to Alexa [2].
However, it is well known that social networks are vul-
nerable to Sybil attacks, in which attackers maintain a large
number of Sybils, e.g., spammers, fake users, and compro-
mised normal users. For instance, 10% of Twitter users were
fake [3]. Adversaries can leverage such Sybils to perform
various malicious activities such as disrupting democratic
election [4], influencing financial market [5], distributing
spams and phishing attacks [6], as well as harvesting private
user data [7]. Therefore, Sybil detection in social networks is
an urgent research problem.
Indeed, this research problem has attracted increasing
attention from multiple research communities including net-
working, security, and data mining. Among various meth-
ods, structure-based methods have demonstrated promis-
ing results, e.g., SybilRank [8] was deployed to detect a
large amount of Sybils in Tuenti, the largest online social
network in Spain. Most structure-based methods [8], [9],
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[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20],
[21] can be grouped into two categories: Random Walk
(RW)-based methods and Loop Belief Propagation (LBP)-
based methods. Given a training dataset, these methods
iteratively propagate label information among the social
graph to predict labels for users. RW-based methods im-
plement the propagation using random walks, while LBP-
based methods implement the propagation using Loopy
Belief Propagation [22]. RW-based methods [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] suffer from one or two major
limitations: 1) they can only leverage either labeled benign
users or labeled Sybils in the training dataset, but not both,
which limits their detection accuracies; and 2) they are not
robust to label noise in the training dataset. The label of
a user is noisy if the label is incorrect. Label noise often
exists in practice due to human mistakes when manually
labeling users [6], [23]. LBP-based methods [18], [19], [20]
suffer from three major limitations: 1) they cannot guarantee
convergence on real-world social networks; 2) they are not
scalable; and 3) they do not have theoretically guaranteed
performance. The first limitation makes LBP-based methods
sensitive to the number of iterations that the methods run.
Our work: We propose a novel structure-based method,
called SybilSCAR, to perform Sybil detection in social net-
works. SybilSCAR combines the advantages of RW-based
methods and LBP-based methods, while overcoming their
limitations. Specifically, SybilSCAR is Scalable, Convergent,
Accurate, and Robust to label noise.
First, we propose a general framework to unify state-
of-the-art RW-based and LBP-based methods. Under our
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framework, each structure-based method can be viewed
as iteratively applying a local rule to every node, which
propagates label information from the training dataset to
other nodes in the social network. A local rule updates a
node’s label information via combining the node’s neigh-
bors’ label information and the prior knowledge that we
know about the node. Although RW-based methods and
LBP-based methods use very different mathematical foun-
dations (i.e., RW vs. LBP), they can be viewed as applying
different local rules under our framework. Our framework
makes it possible to compare different methods in a unified
way. Moreover, our framework provides new insights on
how to design better structure-based methods. Specifically,
designing better structure-based methods reduces to design-
ing better local rules.
Second, we design a novel local rule that integrates
the advantages of both RW-based methods and LBP-based
methods, while overcoming their limitations. SybilSCAR
iteratively applies our local rule to every user. Our local rule,
like RW-based methods and LBP-based methods, leverages
the homophily property of social networks. Homophily means
that two linked users share the same label with a high
probability. In our local rule, we associate a weight with
each edge, which represents the probability that the two
corresponding users have the same label. For a neighbor
v of u, our local rule models v’s influence (we call it
neighbor influence) to u’s label as the probability that u is a
Sybil, given v’s information alone. Our local rule combines
neighbor influences and prior knowledge about a user in a
multiplicative way to update knowledge about the user’s
label. Moreover, we linearize the multiplicative local rule in
order to make SybilSCAR convergent.
Third, we evaluate SybilSCAR and compare it with
state-of-the-art RW-based methods and LBP-based methods
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we derive a
bound on the number of Sybils that are accepted into a social
network for SybilSCAR. Our bound is tighter than those of
the existing methods. Moreover, we analyze the condition
when SybilSCAR is guaranteed to converge. Empirically,
we compare SybilSCAR with SybilRank [8], a state-of-the-
art RW-based method, and SybilBelief [18], a state-of-the-
art LBP-based method, using 1) three real-world social net-
works with synthesized Sybils and 2) a large-scale Twitter
dataset (41.7M users and 1.2B edges) with real Sybils. Our
empirical results demonstrate that 1) SybilSCAR achieves
better detection accuracies than SybilRank and SybilBelief,
2) SybilSCAR is robust to larger label noise than SybilRank,
and is as robust as SybilBelief; 3) SybilSCAR is as space and
time efficient as SybilRank, but is several times more space
efficient and one order of magnitude more time efficient
than SybilBelief; 4) SybilSCAR and SybilRank are conver-
gent, but SybilBelief is not. For instance, in the large Twitter
dataset, among the top-10K users that are predicted to be
most likely Sybils by SybilRank, SybilBelief, and SybilSCAR,
0.33%, 77.5%, and 95.8% of them are real Sybils, respectively.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We propose SybilSCAR, a novel structure-based meth-
ods, to detect Sybils in social networks. SybilSCAR is
convergent, scalable, robust to label noise, and more
accurate than existing methods.
• We propose a local rule-based framework to unify state-
of-the-art RW-based methods and LBP-based methods.
Under our framework, we design a novel local rule that
is the key component of SybilSCAR.
• We evaluate SybilSCAR both theoretically and empiri-
cally, and compare it with a state-of-the-art RW-based
method and a state-of-the-art LBP-based method. Our
theoretical results show that SybilSCAR has a tighter
bound on the number of Sybils that are falsely ac-
cepted into a social network than existing methods. Our
empirical results on multiple social network datasets
demonstrate that SybilSCAR significantly outperforms
the state-of-the-art RW-based method in terms of accu-
racy and robustness to label noise, and that SybilSCAR
outperforms the state-of-the-art LBP-based method in
terms of accuracy, scalability, and convergence.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Structure-based Methods
We classify structure-based methods into Random Walk
(RW)-based methods and Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP)-
based methods. Structure-based methods aim to leverage
social structure [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. The key intuition is that, although
an attacker can control the connections between Sybils
arbitrarily, it is harder for the attacker to manipulate the
connections between benign nodes and Sybils, because such
manipulation requires actions from benign nodes. There-
fore, benign nodes and Sybils have a structural gap, which
is leveraged by RW-based and LBP-based methods.
RW-based methods: Example RW-based based methods in-
clude SybilGuard [9], SybilLimit [10], SybilInfer [11], Sybil-
Rank [8], Criminal account Inference Algorithm (CIA) [13],
I´ntegro [14], and SybilWalk [16]. Specifically, SybilGuard [9]
and SybilLimit [10] assume that it is easy for short random
walks starting from a labeled benign user to quickly reach
other benign users, while hard for short random walks start-
ing from Sybils to reach benign users. SybilGuard and Sybil-
Limit use the same RW lengths for all nodes. SmartWalk [15]
leverages machine learning classifiers to predict the appro-
priate RW length for different nodes, and can improve the
performance of SybilLimit via using the predicted (different)
RW length for each node. SybilInfer [11] combines RWs with
Bayesian inference and Monte-Carlo sampling to directly
detect the bottleneck cut between benign users and Sybils.
SybilRank [8] uses short RWs to distribute benignness scores
from a set of labeled benign users to all the remaining users.
CIA [13] distributes badness scores from a set of labeled
Sybils to other users. With a certain probability, CIA restarts
the RW from the initial probability distribution, which is
assigned based on the set of labeled Sybils. I´ntegro [14]
improves SybilRank by first leveraging victim prediction (a
victim is a user that connects to at least one Sybil) to assign
weights to edges of a social network and then performing
random walks on the weighted social network.
Existing RW-based methods suffer from one or two key
limitations: 1) they can only leverage either labeled benign
users or labeled Sybils, but not both, which limits their
detection accuracies; and 2) they are not robust to label noise
in the training dataset. Specifically, SybilGuard, SybilLimit,
SybilInfer, and SmartWalk only leverage one labeled benign
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node, making their accuracy limited [8] and making them
sensitive to label noise. Moreover, they are not scalable to
large-scale social networks because they need to simulate
a large number of random walks. SybilRank was shown to
outperform a variety of Sybil detection methods [8], and we
treat it as a state-of-the-art RW-based method. SybilRank can
only leverage the labeled benign users in a training dataset,
which limits its detection accuracy, as we will demonstrate
in our experiments. Moreover, SybilRank is not robust to
label noise, as we will demonstrate in our experiments.
LBP-based methods: LBP-based methods [18], [19], [20],
[21] also leverage the structure of the social network. Sybil-
Belief models a social network as a pairwise Markov Ran-
dom Field (pMRF). Given some labeled Sybils and labeled
benign users, SybilBelief first assigns prior probabilities to
them and then uses LBP [22] to iteratively estimate the
posterior probability of being a Sybil for each remaining
user. The posterior probability of being a Sybil is used
to predict a user’s label. SybilBelief can leverage both la-
beled Sybils and labeled benign users simultaneously, and
it is robust to label noise [18]. Gao et al. [19] and Fu et
al. [20] demonstrated that SybilBelief can achieve better
performance when learning the node and edge priors using
local graph structure analysis. However, SybilBelief and its
variants suffer from three limitations: 1) they are not guar-
anteed to converge because LBP might oscillate on graphs
with loops [22]; 2) they are not scalable because LBP requires
storing and maintaining messages on each edge; and 3) they
do not have theoretically guaranteed performance. The first
limitation means that their performance heavily relies on the
number of iterations that LBP runs, but the best number of
iterations might be different for different social networks.
We note that Wang et al. [21] recently proposed GANG,
which generalized SybilBelief to directed social graphs (e.g.,
Twitter) and extended the techniques proposed in this work
to make GANG scalable and convergent.
2.2 Other methods
Some methods detect Sybils via binary machine learning
classifiers. In particular, most methods in this direction
represent each user using a set of features, which can be
extracted from users’ local subgraph structure (e.g., ego-
network) [24], [25] and side information (e.g., IP address,
behaviors, and content) [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32],
[33]. Then, given a training dataset consisting of labeled
benign users and labeled Sybils, they learn a binary clas-
sifier, e.g., logistic regression. Finally, the classifier is used
to predict labels for the remaining users. A fundamental
limitation of these methods is that attackers can mimic
benign users by manipulating their profiles, so as to bypass
the detection. However, we believe these methods can still
be used to filter the basic Sybils. Moreover, these feature-
based methods can be further combined with structure-
based methods. For instance, for each user, the classifier
can produce a probability that the user is a Sybil; such
probabilities can be used as prior probabilities in LBP-
based methods, e.g., SybilBelief [18]. Indeed, Gao et al. [19]
generalized SybilBelief to incorporate such feature-based
priors and demonstrated performance improvement.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
We formally define our structure-based Sybil detection
problem, introduce our design goals, and describe the threat
model we consider in the paper.
3.1 Structure-based Sybil Detection
Suppose we are given an undirected social network G =
(V,E), where a node v ∈ V represents a user and an edge
(u, v) ∈ E indicates a mutual relationship between u and v.
|V | and |E| are number of nodes and edges, respectively. For
instance, on Facebook, an edge (u, v) could mean that u is in
v’s friend list and vice versa. On Twitter, an edge (u, v) could
mean that u follows v. Our structure-based Sybil detection
is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Structure-based Sybil Detection). Suppose we
are given a social network and a training dataset consisting of
some labeled Sybils and labeled benign nodes. Structure-based
Sybil detection is to predict the label of each remaining node by
leveraging the global structure of the social network.
Like most existing studies on structure-based Sybil de-
tection, we focus on undirected social networks. However,
our methods can be generalized to directed social networks.
For instance, Wang et al. [21] generalized our methods to
design a LBP-based method for directed social networks.
3.2 Design Goals
We target a method that satisfies the following goals:
1) Leveraging both labeled benign users and Sybils: Social
network service providers often have a set of labeled benign
users and labeled Sybils. For instance, verified users on
Twitter or Facebook can be treated as labeled benign users;
users spreading spam or malware can be treated as labeled
Sybils, which can be obtained through manual inspection [8]
or crowdsourcing [34]. Our method should be able to lever-
age both labeled benign users and labeled Sybils to enhance
detection accuracy.
2) Robust to label noise: A given label of a user is noisy if it
does not match the user’s true label. Labeled users may have
noisy labels. For instance, an adversary could compromise
a labeled benign user or make a Sybil whitelisted as a
benign user. In addition, labels obtained through manual
inspection, especially crowdsourcing, often contain noises
due to human mistakes [34]. We target a method that is
robust when a minority fraction of given labels are incorrect.
3) Scalable: Real-world social networks often have hun-
dreds of millions of users and edges. Therefore, our method
should be scalable and easily parallelizable.
4) Convergent: Existing methods and our method are
iterative methods. Convergence makes it easy to determine
when to stop an iterative method. It is hard to set the best
number of iterations for an iterative method that is not
convergent. Therefore, our method should be convergent.
5) Theoretical guarantee: Our method should have a theo-
retical guarantee on the number of Sybils that can be falsely
accepted into a social network. This theoretical guarantee
is important for security-critical applications that leverage
social networks, e.g., social network based Sybil defense in
peer-to-peer and distributed systems [9], and social network
based anonymous communications [35].
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Benign Region Sybil Region
Attack edges
Fig. 1. Benign region, Sybil region, and attack edges.
Existing RW-based SybilGuard [9] and SybilLimit [10] do
not satisfy requirements 1), 2), and 3); SybilInfer [11] only
satisfies the requirement 4); SybilRank [8] and I´ntegro [14]
do not satisfy requirements 1) and 2); CIA [13] does not
satisfy requirements 1), 2), and 5). Existing LBP-based Sybil-
Belief [18] and SybilFuse [19] do not satisfy requirements 3),
4), and 5).
3.3 Threat Model
We call the subgraph containing all benign nodes and edges
between them the benign region, and call the subgraph
containing all Sybil nodes and edges between them the Sybil
region. Edges between the two regions are called attack edges.
Figure 1 illustrates these concepts.
One basic assumption under structure-based Sybil de-
tection methods is that the benign region and the Sybil
region are sparsely connected (i.e., the number of attack
edges is relatively small), compared with the edges among
the two regions. In other words, most benign users would
not establish trust relationships with Sybils. We note that
this assumption is equivalent to requiring that the social
network follows homophily, i.e., two linked nodes share the
same label with a high probability. For an extreme example,
if the benign region and the Sybil region are separated from
each other, then the social network has a perfect homophily,
i.e., every two linked nodes have the same label. Note that,
it is of great importance to obtain social networks that
satisfy this assumption, otherwise the detection accuracies
of structure-based methods are limited. For instance, Yang
et al. [36] showed that RenRen friendship social network
does not satisfy this assumption, and thus the performance
of structure-based methods are unsatisfactory. However,
Cao et al. [8] found that Tuenti, the largest online social
network in Spain, satisfies the homophily assumption, and
thus SybilRank can detect a large amount of Sybils in Tuenti.
Generally speaking, there are two ways for service
providers to construct a social network that satisfies ho-
mophily. One way is to approximately obtain trust relation-
ships between users by looking into user interactions [37],
predicting tie strength [38], asking users to rate their social
contacts [39], etc. The other way is to preprocess the network
structure so that structure-based methods are suitable to be
applied. Specifically, analysts could detect and remove com-
promised benign nodes (e.g., front peers) [40], or employ
feature-based classifier to filter Sybils, so as to decrease the
number of attack edges and enhance the homophily. For
instance, Alvisi et al. [41] showed that if the attack edges
Prior	  
knowledge,	  q
Local	  rule
G=(V,E)
Posterior	  
knowledge,	  p
Fig. 2. Our proposed framework to unify state-of-the-art RW-based and
LBP-based Sybil detection methods.
are established randomly, simple feature-based classifiers
are sufficient to enforce Sybils to be suitable for structure-
based Sybil detection. We note that the reason why the
RenRen friendship social network did not satisfy homophily
in the study of Yang et al. is that RenRen even didn’t deploy
simple feature-based classifiers at that time [36].
Formally, we measure homophily as the fraction of edges
in the social network that are not attack edges. For the same
benign region and Sybil region, more attack edges indicate
weaker homophily. As we will demonstrate in our empirical
evaluations, our SybilSCAR can tolerate weaker homophily
than existing methods.
When analyzing the theoretical bound on the falsely ac-
cepted Sybils, SybilSCAR further assumes that the iterative
process of SybilSCAR converges fast in the benign region,
which is similar to the fast mixing assumption of RW-based
methods.
4 OUR LOCAL RULE-BASED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we unify existing RW-based methods [8],
[12], [13], [14], [15] and LBP-based methods [18], [19] into
a local rule-based framework. Specifically, these methods
first assign the prior knowledge of all nodes using a training
dataset. Then, they propagate the prior knowledge among
the social network to obtain the posterior knowledge via
iteratively applying their local rules to every node. A local
rule is to update the posterior knowledge of a node by combining
the influences from its neighbors with its prior knowledge. We
call the influence from a neighbor neighbor influence. Figure 2
shows our unified framework.
Notations: We denote by wuv the weight of the edge
(u, v), Γu the set of neighbors of node u, and du the total
weights of edges linked to u, i.e., du =
∑
v∈Γu wuv . In
RW-based methods [12], [13], [14], edge weights model the
relative importance (e.g., level of trust) of edges. In LBP-
based method [18], an edge weightwuv models the tendency
that u and v share the same label. We denote by qu and pu
the prior knowledge and posterior knowledge of the node
u, respectively. In RW-based methods, qu and pu are the
prior and posterior reputation scores of u, respectively, and
they represent relative benignness of nodes. In LBP-based
methods, qu and pu are the prior and posterior probabilities
that node u is a Sybil, respectively.
4.1 Additive Local Rule of RW-based Methods
State-of-the-art RW-based methods [8], [12], [13], [14] first
assign prior reputation scores for every node using a train-
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ing dataset. Then they iteratively apply the following local
rule to every node:
pu = (1− α)
∑
v∈Γu
pv
wuv
dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
neighbor influence
+α qu︸︷︷︸
prior knowledge
, (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is called a restart probability of the random
walk. We note that SybilRank uses a restart probability of 0
and normalizes the final reputation scores by node degrees.
We have two observations for the additive local rule.
First, the neighbor influence from a neighbor v to u is a
fraction of v’s current reputation score pv , and the fraction is
proportional to the edge weight wuv . Second, this local rule
combines the prior knowledge and the neighbor influences
linearly to update the posterior knowledge about a node.
4.2 Multiplicative Local Rule of LBP-based Methods
SybilBelief [18], a LBP-based method, associates a binary
random variable xu with each node u, where xu = 1 indi-
cates that u is Sybil while xu = −1 indicates that u is benign.
Then, qu and pu are the prior and posterior probabilities
that xu = 1, respectively. SybilBelief first assigns the prior
probabilities for nodes using a set of labeled benign nodes
and/or a set of labeled Sybils, and then it iteratively applies
the following local rule [18]:
mvu(xu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
neighbor influence
=
∑
xv
φv(xv)ϕvu(xv, xu)
∏
z∈Γv/u
mzv(xv)
(2)
pu =
prior knowledge︷︸︸︷
qu
∏
v∈Γu mvu(1)
qu
∏
v∈Γu mvu(1) + (1− qu)
∏
v∈Γu mvu(−1)
, (3)
where node potential φv(xv) and edge potential ϕvu(xv, xu)
are defined as follows:
φv(xv) :=
{
qv if xv = 1
1− qv if xv = −1
ϕvu(xv, xu) :=
{
wvu if xuxv = 1
1− wvu if xuxv = −1,
We also have two observations for the multiplicative
local rule. First, this local rule explicitly models neighbor in-
fluences. Specifically, the neighbor influence from a neighbor
v to u (i.e., mvu(xu)) is defined in Equation 2. To compute
the neighbor influence mvu(xu), u’s neighbor v needs to
multiply the neighbor influences from all its neighbors
except u. Second, according to Equation 3, this local rule
combines the neighbor influences with the prior probability
nonlinearly.
4.3 Comparing RW-based Additive Local Rule with
LBP-based Multiplicative Local Rule
LBP-based multiplicative local rule can tolerate a relatively
larger fraction of label noise because of its nonlinearity [18],
and it can leverage both labeled benign nodes and labeled
Sybils. However, LBP-based multiplicative local rule is
space and time inefficient because it requires a large amount
of space and time to maintain the neighbor influences asso-
ciated with every edge, and methods using this local rule are
not guaranteed to converge. In contrast, RW-based additive
local rule is space and time efficient, and methods using this
local rule are guaranteed to converge. However, this local
rule is sensitive to label noise, and it cannot leverage labeled
benign nodes and labeled Sybils simultaneously.
5 DESIGN OF SYBILSCAR
Under our framework, designing a new Sybil detection
method is reduced to designing a new local rule. Therefore,
we design a novel local rule. Then, we describe how we
design SybilSCAR based on the new local rule.
5.1 Our New Local Rule
We aim to design a local rule that integrates the advantages
of both RW-based and LBP-based local rules, while over-
coming their limitations. Roughly speaking, our idea is to
leverage the multiplicativeness like LBP-based local rule to
be robust to label noise, while avoiding maintaining neighbor
influences to be as space and time efficient as RW-based local
rule. Next, we show how we model neighbor influences and
combine neighbor influences with prior knowledge.
Neighbor influence: We associate a binary random variable
xu with a node u, where xu = 1 and xu = −1 mean that u
is a Sybil and benign node, respectively. We denote pu as the
posterior probability that u is a Sybil, i.e., pu = Pr(xu = 1).
pu > 0.5 means u is more likely to be a Sybil; pu < 0.5
means u is more likely to be benign; and pu = 0.5 means
we cannot decide u’s label. We model the probability that u
and v have the same label as wvu ∈ [0, 1], which defines the
homophily strength of the edge (u, v). Formally, we have:
Pr(xu = 1|xv = 1) = Pr(xu = −1|xv = −1) = wvu,
Pr(xu = 1|xv = −1) = Pr(xu = −1|xv = 1) = 1− wvu.
wuv > 0.5 means that u and v are in a homogeneous relation-
ship, i.e., they tend to share the same label; wuv < 0.5 means
that u and v are in a heterogeneous relationship, i.e., they tend
to have the opposite labels; and wuv = 0.5 means that u and
v are not correlated.
We denote by fvu the neighbor influence of a neighbor v to
u. fvu is defined as the probability that u is a Sybil (i.e., xu =
1), given the neighbor v’s information alone. According to
the law of total probability, we compute fvu as:
fvu = Pr(xu = 1|xv = 1)Pr(xv = 1)
+ Pr(xu = 1|xv = −1)Pr(xv = −1)
= wvupv + (1− wvu)(1− pv). (4)
We have several observations from Equation 4:
• v has no neighbor influence to u (i.e., fvu = 0.5) if
v’s label is undecidable (i.e., pv = 0.5) or u and v are
uncorrelated (i.e., wvu = 0.5);
• v has a positive neighbor influence to u if v and u are
in a homogeneous relationship, i.e., if pv > 0.5 (or <
0.5) and wvu > 0.5, then fvu > 0.5 (or < 0.5);
• v has a negative neighbor influence to u if v and u
are in a heterogeneous relationship, i.e., if pv > 0.5
(or < 0.5) and wvu < 0.5, then fvu < 0.5 (or > 0.5).
Combining neighbor influences with prior: In our local
rule, a node’s posterior probability of being Sybil is updated
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by combining its neighbor influences with its prior prob-
ability of being Sybil. In order to tolerate label noise, we
leverage the multiplicative local rule in LBP-based methods.
Specifically, we have:
pu =
qu
∏
v∈Γu fvu
qu
∏
v∈Γu fvu + (1− qu)
∏
v∈Γu(1− fvu)
. (5)
However, methods that iteratively apply the above mul-
tiplicative local rule to every user are not guaranteed to
converge. Therefore we further linearize Equation 5. We first
define two concepts residual variable and residual vector.
Definition 2 (Residual Variable and Vector). We define the
residual of a variable y as yˆ = y− 0.5; and we define the residual
vector yˆ of y as yˆ = [y1 − 0.5, y2 − 0.5, · · · ].
With above definition, we denote wˆvu as the residual
homophily strength. Moreover, by substituting variables in
Equation 4 with their corresponding residuals, we have the
residual neighbor influence fˆvu as follows:
fˆvu = 2pˆvwˆvu. (6)
Based on the approximations ln(1 + x) ≈ x and ln(1 −
x) ≈ −x when x is small, we have the following theorem,
which linearizes Equation 5.
Theorem 1. The residual posterior probability of being a Sybil
for a node u can be linearized as:
pˆu = qˆu +
∑
v∈Γ(u)
fˆvu. (7)
Proof. See Appendix A.
By combining Equation 6 and Equation 7, we obtain our
new local rule as follows:
Our local rule: pˆu = qˆu + 2
∑
v∈Γ(u)
pˆvwˆvu. (8)
5.2 SybilSCAR Algorithm
Our SybilSCAR iteratively applies our local rule to every
node to compute the posterior probabilities. Suppose we are
given a set of labeled Sybils which we denote as Ls and a set
of labeled benign nodes which we denote as Lb. SybilSCAR
first utilizes Ls and Lb to assign a prior probability of being
a Sybil for all nodes. Specifically,
qu =

0.5 + θ if u ∈ Ls
0.5− θ if u ∈ Lb
0.5 otherwise,
(9)
where θ > 0 indicates that we assign a higher prior proba-
bility of being a Sybil to labeled Sybils. Considering that the
labels might have noise, we will set θ to be smaller than 0.5.
In practice, these prior probabilities can also be obtained
from feature-based methods. Specifically, for each user we
can leverage a binary classifier, trained using user’s local
features, to produce the probability of being a Sybil, which
can then be treated as the user’s prior probability. With such
prior probabilities, SybilSCAR iteratively applies our local
rule in Equation 8 to update residual posterior probabilities
of all nodes.
Algorithm 1 SybilSCAR
Input: G = (V,E), Ls, Lb, θ, Wˆ, δ, and T .
Output: pu,∀u ∈ V .
Initialize pˆ(0) = qˆ.
Initialize t = 1.
while ‖pˆ
(t)−pˆ(t−1)‖1
‖pˆ(t)‖1 ≥ δ and t ≤ T do
Update residual posterior vector pˆ(t) using Equation 10.
t = t+ 1.
end while
return pˆ(t) + 0.5.
Representing SybilSCAR as a matrix form: For con-
venience, we denote by a vector q the prior probability
of being a Sybil for all nodes, i.e., q = [q1; q2; · · · ; q|V |].
Similarly, we denote by a vector p the posterior probability
of all nodes, i.e., p = [p1; p2; · · · ; p|V |]. Moreover, we denote
qˆ and pˆ as the residual prior probability vector and residual
posterior probability vector of all nodes, respectively. We
denote A ∈ R|V |×|V | as the adjacency matrix of the social
graph, where the uth row represents the neighbors of u.
Formally, if there exists an edge (u, v) between nodes u and
v, then the entry Auv = Avu = 1, otherwise Auv = Avu = 0.
Moreover, we denote Wˆ as the corresponding residual
homophily strength matrix , where wˆvu = 0 if Avu = 0.
With these notations, we can represent our SybilSCAR as
iteratively applying the following equation:
pˆ(t) = qˆ+ 2Wˆpˆ(t−1), (10)
where pˆ(t) is the residual posterior probability vector in the
tth iteration. Initially, we set pˆ(0) = qˆ.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the pseudocode of SybilSCAR.
We stop running SybilSCAR when the relative errors of
residual posterior probabilities between two consecutive
iterations is smaller than some threshold δ or it reaches
the predefined number of maximum iterations T . After
SybilSCAR halts, we predict u to be a Sybil if pu > 0.5,
otherwise we predict u to be benign.
In this paper, we consider the following two cases for
the homophily strength Wˆ. Although we study these two
settings, we believe that learning the homophily strength
for each edge would be a valuable future work.
SybilSCAR-C: In this variant, we use a constant homophily
strength for all edges, i.e., wˆvu = wˆ.
SybilSCAR-D: In this variant, we use a degree-normalized
homophily strength for each edge, i.e., wˆvu = 12du , where du
is the degree of node u. The intuition is that when a node has
many neighbors, each neighbor has a small influence on the
node. In this variant, a node’s residual posterior probability
is the sum of its residual prior probability and the average
residual posterior probability of its neighbors. We note
that SybilSCAR-D essentially uses the RW-based neighbor
influence proposed by SybilWalk [16]. The differences with
SybilWalk include 1) SybilWalk resets the residual posterior
probabilities of labeled nodes to their residual prior proba-
bilities in each iteration, and 2) SybilWalk does not consider
prior probabilities of unlabeled nodes.
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6 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We first analyze the convergence condition of SybilSCAR.
Then we analyze its peformance bound. Finally, we analyze
its computational complexity.
6.1 Convergence Condition
We analyze the condition when SybilSCAR converges.
Lemma 1 (Sufficient and Necessary Convergence Condition
for a Linear System [42]). Suppose we are given an iterative
linear process: y(t) ← c+My(t−1). The linear process converges
with any initial choice y(0) if and only if the spectral radius1 of
M is smaller than 1, i.e., ρ(M) < 1.
Proof. See [42].
Based on Equation 10 and Lemma 1, we are able to
analyze the convergence condition of SybilSCAR.
Theorem 2 (Sufficient and Necessary Convergence Condi-
tion of SybilSCAR). The sufficient and necessary condition that
makes SybilSCAR converge is equivalent to
ρ(Wˆ) <
1
2
. (11)
Proof. By directly using Lemma 1 in Equation 10.
Theorem 2 provides a strong sufficient and necessary
convergence condition. However, in practice using Theo-
rem 2 is computationally expensive, as it involves comput-
ing the largest eigenvalue with respect to spectral radius
of Wˆ. Hence, we instead derive a sufficient condition for
SybilSCAR’s convergence, which enables us to set wˆ with
cheap computation. Specifically, our sufficient condition is
based on the fact that any norm is an upper bound of the
spectral radius [43], i.e., ρ(M) ≤ ‖M‖, where ‖ · ‖ indicates
some matrix norm. In particular, we use the induced l∞
matrix norm ‖ · ‖∞ 2. In this way, our sufficient condition
for convergence is as follows:
Theorem 3 (Sufficient Convergence Condition of
SybilSCAR). A sufficient condition that makes SybilSCAR
converge is
‖Wˆ‖∞ < 1
2
. (12)
Proof. As ρ(Wˆ) ≤ ‖Wˆ‖∞, we achieve the sufficient condi-
tion by enforcing 2‖Wˆ‖∞ < 1, and thus ‖Wˆ‖∞ < 12 .
Next, we derive the sufficient convergence condition for
SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D, respectively.
SybilSCAR-C: By applying Theorem 3, we have the suf-
ficient condition for SybilSCAR-C to converge as wˆ <
1
2‖A‖∞ =
1
2 maxu∈V du
. Note that our result provides a guide-
line to set wˆ, i.e., once wˆ is smaller than the inverse of 2 times
of the maximum node degree, SybilSCAR-C is guaranteed to
converge. In practice, however, some nodes (e.g., celebrities)
could have orders of magnitude bigger degrees than the
others (e.g., ordinary people), and such nodes make wˆ very
1. The spectral radius of a square matrix is the maximum of the
absolute values of its eigenvalues.
2. ‖M‖∞ = maxi
∑
j |Mij |, the maximum absolute row sum of the
matrix.
TABLE 1
Summary of theoretical guarantees of various structure-based
methods. g is the number of attack edges (sum of weights on the attack
edge for I´ntegro) and d(B)min is the minimum node degree in the
benign region. SybilGuard requires g = o(
√|V |/ log |V |). The symbol
“–” means the corresponding bound is unknown.
Method #Accepted Sybils
SybilGuard [9] O(g
√|V | log |V |)
SybilLimit [10] O(g log |V |)
SybilInfer [11] –
SybilRank [8] O(g log |V |)
CIA [13] –
I´ntegro [14] O(g log |V |)
SybilBelief [18] –
SybilSCAR-D O( g log |V |
d(S) )
small. In our experiments, we found that SybilSCAR-C can
still converge when replacing the maximum node degree
with the average node degree.
SybilSCAR-D: In this case, the summation of each row of
Wˆ has a fixed value 12 . Therefore, ‖W‖∞ = 12 . In practice,
it is often ρ(Wˆ) < ‖Wˆ‖∞, which implies that ρ(Wˆ) < 12 .
Therefore, SybilSCAR-D is also convergent.
6.2 Security Guarantee
Existing RW-based methods: Some existing RW-based
Sybil detection methods [8], [9], [10], [11], [14] have theo-
retical guarantees on the number of Sybils that are falsely
accepted into a social network. For instance, Table 1 shows
the theoretical guarantees of some representative methods.
These guarantees are achieved based on the assumption that
the benign region of the social network is fast-mixing [44].
Roughly speaking, a graph is fast mixing if a random walk
on the graph converges to its stationary distribution in
O(log |V |) iterations.
SybilSCAR: We will derive security guarantee for a
“weaker” version of SybilSCAR-D. In SybilSCAR-D, in each
iteration, a node’s residual posterior probability is the sum
of its residual prior probability and the average residual
posterior probability of its neighbors. In other words, in
each iteration, a node’s prior probability is injected to influ-
ence the dynamics of nodes’ residual posterior probabilities,
which makes it harder to analyze the dynamics of residual
posterior probabilities. Therefore, we consider a weaker
version of SybilSCAR-D, in which the nodes’ residual prior
probabilities are only injected in the initialization step. In
other words, we have
pˆ(0) = qˆ (13)
pˆ(t+1)u =
∑
v∈Γ(u)
pˆ
(t)
v
du
. (14)
This version of SybilSCAR-D has a converged solution that
every node has the same residual posterior probability, i.e.,
pˆu = pi for every node u is a solution for SybilSCAR-D.
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Fig. 3. Residual posterior probabilities of unlabeled benign nodes.
We have the following security guarantee for this version of
SybilSCAR-D:
Theorem 4. Suppose SybilSCAR-D only leverages the nodes’
prior probabilities in the initialization step, residual posterior
probabilities in the benign region converge in O(log |V |)) iter-
ations (this is similar to the fast mixing assumption of RW-based
methods), the attacker randomly establishes g attack edges, and
we are only given some labeled benign nodes. Then, the total
number of Sybils whose residual posterior probabilities of being
Sybil are lower than those of certain benign nodes is bounded by
O( g log |V |d(S) ), where d(S) is the average node degree in the Sybil
region.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 4 implies that when Sybils are more densely
connected among themselves (i.e., the average degree d(S)
is larger), it is easier for SybilSCAR to detect them. An
intuitional explanation is that, when the Sybil region is
more dense, a larger proportion of the residual posterior
probabilities would be propagated among the Sybil region.
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical performance bound of
existing structure-based methods. For SybilRank, I´ntegro,
and CIA, the metric #accepted Sybils means the number of
Sybils that are ranked lower than certain benign nodes. For
the rest of methods, #accepted Sybils means the number
of Sybils that are classified as benign. As we can see, our
SybilSCAR achieves the tightest bound on the number of
falsely accepted Sybils. We note that deriving security guar-
antee for SybilSCAR-C is still an open challenge. However,
as we will demonstrate in our experiments, SybilSCAR-C
outperforms SybilSCAR-D.
One key assumption of Theorem 4 is that residual
posterior probabilities in the benign region converge after
O(log |V |)) iterations. In other words, nodes in the benign
region have similar residual posterior probabilities after
O(log |V |)) iterations. We validate this assumption via sim-
ulations. Specifically, we synthesize a benign region and a
Sybil region with 1,000 nodes and an average degree of
40 via the Erdos–Renyi (ER) model [45] or the Preferential
Attachment (PA) model [46]; we randomly add 1,000 attack
edges between the two regions; and we randomly label
10 benign nodes as the training set. Figure 3 shows the
residual posterior probabilities of unlabeled benign nodes
after log |V | iterations. We observe that unlabeled benign
nodes have similar residual posterior probabilities.
TABLE 2
Dataset statistics.
Dataset #Nodes #Edges Ave. degree
Facebook 4,039 88,234 43.69
Enron 33,696 180,811 10.73
Epinions 75,877 811,478 21.39
Twitter 41,652,230 1,202,513,046 57.74
6.3 Complexity Analysis
SybilSCAR (both SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D), state-of-
the-art RW-based methods [8], [12], [13], and LBP-based
method [18] have the same space complexity, i.e., O(|E|),
and their time complexity is O(t|E|), where t is the number
of iterations. Although SybilSCAR and SybilBelief (a LBP-
based method) have the same asymptotic space and time
complexity, SybilSCAR is several times more space efficient
and significantly more time efficient than SybilBelief in
practice, as we demonstrate in our experiments. This is
because SybilBelief needs to store neighbor influences (i.e.,
mvu(xu)) in both directions of every edge and update them
in every iteration.
Parallel implementation: SybilSCAR, state-of-the-art RW-
based methods [8], [12], [13], and LBP-based methods [18],
[19] can be easily implemented in parallel. Specifically, we
can divide nodes into groups, and a thread or computer
applies the corresponding local rule to a group of nodes
iteratively.
7 EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS
We compare our SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D with Sybil-
Rank [8], a state-of-the-art RW-based method, and SybilBe-
lief [18], a state-of-the-art LBP-based method, in terms of
accuracy, robustness to label noise, scalability, and conver-
gence.
7.1 Experimental Setup
7.1.1 Dataset Description
We use 1) three real-world social networks with synthesized
Sybils and 2) a large-scale Twitter dataset with real Sybils
for evaluations. Table 2 shows some basic statistics about
our datasets.
Social networks with synthesized Sybils: We use a real so-
cial graph as the benign region while synthesizing the Sybil
region and adding attack edges between the two regions
uniformly at random. There are different ways to synthesize
the Sybil region. For instance, we can use a network model
(e.g., Preferential Attachment (PA) model [46]) to generate a
Sybil region. A Sybil region that is synthesized by a network
model might be structurally very different from the benign
region, e.g., although the PA model can generate graphs that
have similar degree distribution with real social networks,
the generated graphs have very small clustering coefficients,
which is very different from real-world social networks.
Such structural difference could bias Sybil detection re-
sults [41]. Moreover, a Sybil region synthesized by a network
model like PA does not have community structures, making
it unrealistic. Therefore, following recent studies [18], [41],
we consider a Sybil attack in which the Sybil region is a
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Fig. 4. AUCs of compared methods as the number of attack edges becomes large. SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D are substantially more accurate
than SybilRank, and SybilSCAR-C is slightly more accurate than SybilBelief and SybilSCAR-D, when the number of attack edges is large.
replicate of the benign region. This way of synthesizing the
Sybil region can avoid the structural difference between the
two regions, and both Sybil region and benign region have
complex community structures.
We utilize three social networks, i.e., Facebook (4,039
nodes and 88,234 edges), Enron (33,696 nodes and 180,811
edges), and Epinions (75,877 nodes and 811,478 edges),
to represent different application scenarios. We obtained
these datasets from SNAP (http://snap.stanford.edu/
data/index.html). A node in Facebook dataset represents
a user in Facebook, and two nodes are connected if they
are friends. A node in Enron dataset represents an email
address, and an edge between two nodes indicate at least
one email was exchanged between the two corresponding
email addresses. Epinions is a who-trust-whom online social
network of a general consumer review site Epinions.com.
The nodes in Epinions denote members of the site. And
in order to maintain quality, Epinsons encourages users to
specify which other users they trust, and uses the resulting
web of the trust to order the product reviews seem by each
person. For each social network, we use it as the benign
region and replicate it as a Sybil region. Moreover, without
otherwise mentioned, we add 1,000 attack edges uniformly
at random.
Twitter dataset with real Sybils: We obtained a snapshot
of a large-scale Twitter follower-followee network crawled
by Kwak et al. [47]. We transformed the follower-followee
network into an undirected one via keeping an edge be-
tween two users if there are at least one directed edge
between them. The undirected Twitter graph has 41,652,230
nodes and 1,202,513,046 edges, with an average degree of
57.74. To perform evaluation, we need ground truth labels
of the users. Since the Twitter network includes users’
Twitter IDs, we wrote a crawler to visit each user’s profile
using Twitter’s API, which told us the status (i.e., active,
suspended, or deleted) of each user. We found that 205,355
users were suspended by Twitter and we treated them as
Sybils; 36,156,909 users were still active and we treated them
as benign users. The remaining 5,289,966 users were deleted.
As deleted users could be deleted by Twitter or by users
themselves, we could not distinguish the two cases without
accessing to Twitter’s internal data. Therefore, we treat them
as unlabeled users. The average number of attack edges per
Sybil is 181.55. Therefore, the Twitter network has a very
weak homophily. Note that the number of benign users and
the number of Sybils are very unbalanced, i.e., the number
of labeled benign users is 176 times larger than the number
of labeled Sybils.
Training and testing sets: For a social network with syn-
thesized Sybils, we select 200 nodes uniformly at random
and use them as a training dataset. For the Twitter dataset,
we select 500,000 nodes uniformly at random and use them
as a training dataset. The remaining benign and Sybil nodes
are used as testing data.
7.1.2 Compared Methods
We compare SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D with Sybil-
Rank [8], a state-of-the-art RW-based method, and SybilBe-
lief [18], a state-of-the-art LBP-based method. In addition,
we use random guessing as a baseline.
For SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D, we set θ = 0.1 to
consider possible label noises, i.e., we assign a prior proba-
bility 0.6, 0.4, and 0.5 to labeled Sybils, labeled benign users,
and unlabeled nodes, respectively. We set δ = 10−3 and
T = 20. Considering different average degrees of Facebook,
Enron, Epinions, and Twitter, we set wˆ = 0.01, 0.04, 0.02,
and 0.01 for SybilSCAR-C, respectively. We set the param-
eters of SybilRank and SybilBelief according to the papers
that introduced them. For instance, for SybilBelief, the edge
weight is set to be 0.9 for all edges; SybilRank requires
early termination, and we set the number of iterations as
dlog(|V |)e.
We implemented SybilRank, SybilSCAR-C, and
SybilSCAR-D in C++. We obtained a basic implementation
of SybilBelief (also in C++) from its authors and optimized
the implementation. We performed all our experiments on
a Linux machine with 16GB memory and 8 cores.
7.2 Ranking Accuracy
7.2.1 Results on Social Networks with Synthesized Sybils
Viswanath et al. [48] demonstrated that Sybil detection
methods can be treated as ranking mechanisms, and they
can be evaluated using Area Under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic Curve (AUC). Therefore, we adopt AUC to
evaluate ranking accuracy. Suppose we rank nodes with
respect to their posterior reputation/probability of being
a Sybil in a descending order. AUC is the probability that
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Fig. 5. Fraction of Sybils in top ranked intervals on the Twitter dataset.
SybilSCAR-C performs better than SybilBelief and SybilSCAR-D, while
SybilSCAR-D and SybilBelief perform much better than SybilRank.
a randomly selected Sybil ranks higher than a randomly
selected benign node. Note that random guessing, which
ranks all nodes uniformly at random, has an AUC of 0.5.
Figure 4 shows AUCs of the compared methods as
we increase the number of attack edges from 1,000 to
100,000. We have three observations. First, when a social
network has strong homophily, i.e., the number of attack
edges is small, all the compared methods achieve very high
AUCs. For instance, SybilRank, SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-C,
and SybilSCAR-D all achieve AUCs that are close to 1
when the number of attack edges is less than 1,000. Second,
SybilSCAR-C, SybilSCAR-D, and SybilBelief are substan-
tially more accurate than SybilRank when the number of
attack edges becomes large, i.e., the social networks have
weak homophily. A possible reason is that SybilSCAR-C,
SybilSCAR-D, and SybilBelief can leverage both labeled be-
nign users and labeled Sybils in the training dataset. Third,
SybilSCAR-C achieves slightly larger AUCs than SybilBelief
and SybilSCAR-D. Compared with SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-
C uses a new neighbor influence by directly modeling the
homophily property of the social network. Compared with
SybilSCAR-D, SybilSCAR-C uses a constant weight for all
edges, which may make the labeled nodes have larger
influence to their neighbors.
7.2.2 Results on the Large-scale Twitter Dataset
The AUCs of SybilRank, SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-D, and
SybilSCAR-C are 0.37, 0.76, 0.77, and 0.80, respec-
tively. SybilRank performs worse than random guessing.
SybilSCAR-C performs better than SybilSCAR-D, which is
comparable with SybilBelief. These results are consistent
with those in social networks with synthesized Sybils, be-
cause the number of attack edges in the Twitter dataset is
very large. We note that these AUCs are obtained via using
a balanced training dataset. Specifically, among the 500,000
nodes in the training dataset, benign nodes are much more
than Sybils; we subsample some benign nodes such that
we have the same number of benign nodes and Sybils, and
we use them as a balanced training dataset. We found that
all the methods have very low AUCs (worse than random
guessing) if we use the original unbalanced training dataset
consisting of the randomly sampled 500,000 nodes. It would
be an interesting future work to theoretically understand
the impact of balanced/unbalanced training dataset on the
accuracy of these methods.
In practice, the ranking of users can be used as a priority
list to guide human workers to manually inspect users and
detect Sybils. In particular, inspecting users according to
their rankings could aid human workers to detect more
Sybils than inspecting randomly picked users, within the
same amount of time. When ranking is used for such pur-
pose, the number of Sybils in top-ranked users is important
because human workers can only inspect a limited number
of users. AUC measures the overall ranking performance,
but it cannot tell Sybils among the top-ranked users. There-
fore, we further compare the considered methods using the
fraction of Sybils in top-ranked users.
Specifically, for each method, we divide the top-10K
users obtained by the method into 10 intervals, where each
interval has 1K users. Figure 5 shows the fraction of Sybils
in each 1K-user interval for the compared methods. First,
SybilSCAR-C performs better than SybilBelief. Specifically,
the fraction of Sybils ranges from 74.2% to 99.3% in the
top-10 1K-user intervals for SybilSCAR-C, while the range
is from 35.0% to 97.4% for SybilBelief. Second, SybilSCAR-
C and SybilBelief outperform SybilSCAR-D, which demon-
strates that the predefined constant edge weight is more in-
formative than degree-normalized edge weight for ranking
Sybils. Third, SybilRank is close to random guessing.
We note that SybilWalk [16] was shown to achieve good
results on the same Twitter dataset. However, SybilWalk
heavily preprocessed the Twitter dataset (e.g., identifying
the high-degree nodes that have many attack edges and
removing them) to significantly reduce the number of attack
edges. We did not perform such preprocessing since it is
time-consuming to identify such nodes in practice. Without
such preprocessing, SybilWalk has similar performance with
SybilSCAR-D.
7.3 Robustness to label noise
In practice, a training dataset might have noises, i.e., some
labeled benign users are actually Sybils and some labeled
Sybils are actually benign. Such noises could be introduced
by human mistakes [23]. Thus, one natural question is how
label noise impacts the accuracy of detection methods.
For a given level of noise τ%, we randomly choose τ%
of labeled Sybils in the training dataset and mislabel them
as benign users; and we also sample τ% of labeled benign
users in the training dataset and mislabel them as Sybils.
We vary τ% from 10% to 50% with a step size of 10%.
Note that we didn’t perform experiments for τ% > 50%
as all these methods cannot detect Sybils when a majority of
labels are incorrect. Figure 6 shows the AUCs of SybilRank,
SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-C, and SybilSCAR-D on Facebook
(note that we have similar results on Enron and Epinions,
and thus omit them for simplicity) and Twitter datasets
against different levels of label noises. We observe that 1)
SybilSCAR-C has the best robustness against label noise;
2) SybilBelief is slightly more robust than SybilSCAR-D to
label noise; 3) SybilSCAR-C, SybilSCAR-D, and SybilBelief
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Fig. 6. AUCs of SybilRank, SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-D, and SybilSCAR-C vs. level of label noise. SybilSCAR-C is slightly better than SybilSCAR-D
and SybilBelief, while they are much more robust to label noise than SybilRank. Note that SybilBelief and SybilSCAR-C overlap in (a).
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Fig. 7. Space and time efficiency of SybilRank, SybilBelief, and SybilSCAR-C (SybilSCAR-D has the same space and time efficiency with
SybilSCAR-C), vs. number of edges. SybilSCAR-C and SybilRank have almost the same space and time efficiency, while SybilSCAR-C is several
times more space efficient and one order of magnitude more time efficient than SybilBelief.
are more robust to label noise than SybilRank. For instance,
on the Facebook dataset, SybilSCAR-C and SybilBelief can
tolerate label noise up to 40%, SybilSCAR-D can tolerate
label noise up to 30%, while SybilRank performs worse than
random guessing when label noise is higher than 20%.
We believe it is an interesting future work to theoretically
understand the robustness to label noise of different meth-
ods. In the following, we provide a possible explanation on
why SybilSCAR-C, SybilSCAR-D, and SybilBelief are more
robust to label noise than SybilRank. When there are label
noises, some benign nodes are treated as Sybils. The edges
between these nodes and the rest of benign nodes become
attack edges, while the original attack edges that connect
with these nodes become edges in the new Sybil region.
Similarly, some Sybils are mislabeled as benign nodes. The
edges between these nodes and the rest of Sybils are treated
as attack edges, while the original attack edges that connect
with these nodes become edges in the new benign region.
Since we randomly sample mislabeled nodes, the new attack
edges are likely to be more than the original attack edges
that become edges within the new benign region or Sybil
region. Therefore, SybilSCAR-C, SybilSCAR-D, and SybilBe-
lief outperform SybilRank, because they can tolerate a larger
number of attack edges. Moreover, when label noise is larger
than a certain threshold (this threshold is graph-dependent),
the new attack edges are more than what SybilSCAR-C,
SybilSCAR-D, and SybilBelief can tolerate, and thus their
performance degrades significantly.
7.4 Scalability
We evaluate scalability in terms of the peak memory and
time used by each method. Because evaluating scalability
requires social networks with varying number of edges, we
evaluate scalability on synthesized graphs with different
number of edges. Note that our purpose here is not to con-
cern about the accuracy, which depends on the number of
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Fig. 8. Relative errors of SybilRank, SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-D, and
SybilSCAR-C vs. the number of iterations on Facebook with 1,000 attack
edges. SybilRank, SybilSCAR-D, and SybilSCAR-C can converge, but
SybilBelief cannot.
iterations of each method. Thus, to avoid the bias introduced
by the number of iterations, we run all methods with the
same number of iterations.
Figure 7 exhibits the peak memory and time used by
SybilRank, SybilBelief, and SybilSCAR-C (SybilSCAR-D has
the same complexity with SybilSCAR-C, and thus we omit
its results for simplicity) for different number of edges with
20 iterations. We observe that: 1) all methods have linear
space and time complexity, which is consistent with our the-
oretical analysis in Section 6.3; 2) SybilRank and SybilSCAR-
C use almost the same space and time; 3) SybilSCAR-C
requires a few times less memory than SybilBelief and is
one order of magnitude faster than SybilBelief. The reason
is that SybilBelief needs a large amount of resources to store
and maintain the neighbor influence on every edge. We
note that we optimized the implementation of SybilBelief
provided by its authors, and our optimized version is one
order of magnitude faster than the unoptimized version. Us-
ing the unoptimized implementation, SybilSCAR is around
two orders of magnitude faster than SybilBelief, which was
reported in [49].
7.5 Convergence
We define a relative error of residual posterior probability
vectors of SybilSCAR-C (or SybilSCAR-D) as ‖pˆ
(t)−pˆ(t−1)‖1
‖pˆ(t)‖1 ,
where pˆ(t) is the residual vector of posterior probabil-
ity produced by SybilSCAR-C (or SybilSCAR-D) in the
tth iteration. Similarly, we can define relative errors for
SybilRank and SybilBelief using their vectors of posterior
reputation/probability. Figure 8 shows the relative errors
vs. the number of iterations on Facebook with 1,000 at-
tack edges. We observe that 1) SybilSCAR-C, SybilSCAR-
D, and SybilRank converge after several iterations; and 2)
the relative errors of SybilBelief oscillate. SybilBelief does
not converge because there exists many loops in real-world
social networks and LBP may oscillate on graphs with loops,
as pointed out by the author of LBP [22].
7.6 Impact of the Parameter θ
The parameter θ is the residual prior probability of labeled
nodes. Figure 9 shows the AUCs of SybilSCAR-D and
SybilSCAR-C for different θ and different levels of label
noise, where the dataset is Facebook. Note that θ should
be in the range (0, 0.5]. Therefore, we explored the values
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. We observe that both SybilSCAR-D
and SybilSCAR-C are stable with respect to the choice of θ.
7.7 Summary
We summarize our key observations as follows:
• Compared to SybilRank, SybilSCAR-C and
SybilSCAR-D are substantially more accurate
and more robust to label noise.
• Compared to SybilBelief, SybilSCAR-C is more accu-
rate, significantly more scalable, and guaranteed to
converge.
• SybilSCAR-C outperforms SybilSCAR-D, showing
that a constant edge weight is more informative than
degree-normalized edge weight for Sybil detection.
• SybilSCAR-C and SybilSCAR-D are stable with re-
spect to the prior probabilities of the labeled nodes.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we first propose a local rule based frame-
work to unify state-of-the-art Random Walk (RW)-based
and Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP)-based Sybil detection
methods. Our framework makes it possible to analyze and
compare different Sybil detection methods in a unified
way. Second, we design a new local rule. Our local rule
integrates advantages of RW-based methods and LBP-based
methods, while overcoming their limitations. Third, we
perform both theoretical and empirical evaluations. Theo-
retically, SybilSCAR has a tighter asymptotical bound on
the number of Sybils that are falsely accepted into the social
network than existing structure-based methods. Moreover,
SybilSCAR can guarantee to converge. Empirically, our
experimental results on both synthesized Sybils and real-
world Sybils demonstrate that SybilSCAR is more accu-
rate and more robust to label noise than SybilRank, while
SybilSCAR is more accurate and significantly more scalable
than SybilBelief.
Future research directions include 1) learning the ho-
mophily strength for each edge; 2) theoretically analyzing
different local rules with respect to accuracy and robustness
to label noise; 3) theoretically understanding the impacts
of balanced/unbalanced training dataset; and 4) applying
SybilSCAR to detect other types of Sybils such as web
spams, fake reviews, fake likes, etc.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We denoteZu = qu
∏
v∈Γ(u) fvu + (1− qu)
∏
v∈Γ(u)(1− fvu).
Rewriting pu = 1Zu qu
∏
v∈Γ(u) fvu with the corresponding
residual variables yields
0.5 + pˆu =
1
Zu
(
0.5 + qˆu
) ∏
v∈Γ(u)
(
0.5 + fˆvu
)
=⇒ ln(1 + 2pˆu) = − lnZu + ln(1 + 2qˆu) +
∑
v∈Γ(u)
ln
(
0.5 + fˆvu
)
= − lnZu + ln(1 + 2qˆu) +
∑
v∈Γ(u)
ln
(
0.5
)
+
∑
v∈Γ(u)
ln(1 + 2fˆvu)
Using approximation ln(1 + x) ≈ x when x is small, we
have:
2pˆu = − lnZu + 2qˆu + |Γ(u)| · ln(0.5) +
∑
v∈Γ(u)
2fˆvu. (15)
Similarly, via rewriting 1−pu = 1Zu (1−qu)
∏
v∈Γ(u)(1−
fvu) with the corresponding residual variables and using
approximation ln(1− x) ≈ −x when x is small, we have:
−2pˆu = − lnZu−2qˆu + |Γ(u)| · ln(0.5)−
∑
v∈Γ(u)
2fˆvu. (16)
Adding Equation 15 with Equation 16 yields lnZu =
|Γ(u)|·ln(0.5). Via substituting this relation into Equation 15
or Equation 16, we have:
pˆu = qˆu +
∑
v∈Γ(u)
fˆvu. (17)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Overview: We leverage the classic analysis methods pro-
posed by the authors of SybilRank. Specifically, SybilRank
proposed the following three classic steps: 1) modeling
the exchange of trust scores between benign region and
Sybil region in each iteration, 2) modeling the trust score
dynamics in the benign and Sybil regions, and 3) assuming
the increased trust scores in the Sybil region all focus on
a small group of Sybils. We follow these three steps to
analyze residual posterior probabilities in the simplified
version of SybilSCAR-D. However, one key difference is
that SybilSCAR-D uses a different local rule with SybilRank,
and thus the mathematical details in all the three steps are
different.
Notations: We denote by B and S the set of benign nodes
and Sybils, respectively. We denote by d(B) and d(S) the av-
erage degree of benign nodes and Sybil nodes, respectively.
We denote by |B| and |S| the number of benign nodes and
Sybils, respectively. For a node set N , we denote its volume
as the sum of degrees of nodes in N , i.e., V ol(N ) = ∑u∈N
du. Moreover, we have
CB =
g
V ol(B) , CS =
g
V ol(S) , (18)
which were introduced by SybilRank. We denote by Pˆ (t)B
and Pˆ (t)S the average residual posterior probability of benign
nodes and Sybils in the tth iteration, respectively. Initially,
Pˆ
(0)
S = 0 (since we do not consider labeled Sybils in the
training dataset) and Pˆ (0)B < 0.
Exchange of residual posterior probabilities between be-
nign region and Sybil region: In the (t + 1)th iteration,
the average residual posterior probability of Sybils and the
average residual posterior probability of benign nodes can
be approximated as follows:
Pˆ
(t+1)
S = CS Pˆ
(t)
B + (1− CS)Pˆ (t)S , (19)
Pˆ
(t+1)
B = CBPˆ
(t)
S + (1− CB)Pˆ (t)B . (20)
We take Equation 19 as an example to illustrate how we de-
rive the equations. In the considered version of SybilSCAR-
D, in each iteration, a node’s residual posterior probability is
the average of its neighbors’ residual posterior probabilities.
Since we assume the attack edges are randomly estab-
lished between benign nodes and Sybils, the total residual
posterior probability propagated from the benign nodes
to Sybils is gPˆ (t)B . Moreover, the total residual posterior
probability propagated within the Sybils is (V ol(S)−g)Pˆ (t)S ,
because each edge between Sybils contributes one copy
of Pˆ (t)S on average. Since each node takes the average of
its neighbors’ residual posterior probabilities, each Sybil
has an average residual posterior probability Pˆ (t+1)S as
1
|S|d(S) (gPˆ
(t)
B + (V ol(S) − g)Pˆ (t)S ), which gives us Equa-
tion 19.
Note that the derivation of Equations 19 and 20 is in-
spired by SybilRank [8]. However, since SybilSCAR-D and
SybilRank use different local rules (though both are linear
local rules), their exchange dynamics between benign region
and Sybil region are different. This difference leads to dif-
ferent dynamics within benign/Sybil region and eventually
leads to different security guarantees. Given Equations 19
and 20, we have:
Pˆ
(t+1)
B − Pˆ (t+1)S = (1− CB − CS)(Pˆ (t)B − Pˆ (t)S ). (21)
Dynamics in the Sybil and benign regions: The decrease
of the average residual posterior probabilities of Sybils is as
follows:
Pˆ
(t+1)
S − Pˆ (t)S = CS(Pˆ (t)B − Pˆ (t)S ) (22)
= CS(1− CB − CS)(Pˆ (t)B − Pˆ (t)S ) (23)
= (1− CB − CS)tCS(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ), (24)
where the above equation is negative (so we call it a de-
crease) because (Pˆ (0)B −Pˆ (0)S ) is negative. Therefore, we have:
Pˆ
(t)
S − Pˆ (0)S =
t−1∑
i=0
(1− CB − CS)t × CS(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ). (25)
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Similarly, the increase of the average residual posterior
probabilities of benign nodes is as follows:
Pˆ
(t+1)
B − Pˆ (t)B = −CB(Pˆ (t)B − Pˆ (t)S ) (26)
= −(1− CB − CS)tCB(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ) (27)
= −(1− CB − CS)t × CB(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ), (28)
where the above equation is positive (so we call it an
increase) because (Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ) is negative. Furthermore,
we have:
Pˆ
(t)
B − Pˆ (0)B = −
t−1∑
i=0
(1− CB − CS)t × CB(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ). (29)
Security guarantee: We assume after Ω = O(log |V |) itera-
tions, benign nodes have similar residual posterior probabil-
ities, which are the average residual posterior probability of
benign nodes. We note that SybilRank relies on a similar
assumption, i.e., after O(log |V |) iterations, benign nodes
have similar degree-normalized trust scores. We assume
the decrease of residual posterior probabilities of Sybils
all focus on nS Sybils, which gives an upper bound of
Sybils whose residual posterior probabilities are smaller
than benign nodes. If we want these Sybils to have residual
posterior probabilities that are smaller than benign nodes,
then we have:
0− (Pˆ
(0)
S − Pˆ (Ω)S )|S|
nS
< Pˆ
(Ω)
B (30)
⇐⇒ nS < (Pˆ
(Ω)
S − Pˆ (0)S )|S|
Pˆ
(Ω)
B − 0
(31)
⇐⇒ nS < (Pˆ
(Ω)
S − Pˆ (0)S )|S|
Pˆ
(Ω)
B − Pˆ (0)S
, (32)
where the last step holds because Pˆ (0)S = 0. Moreover, we
have:
(Pˆ
(Ω)
S − Pˆ
(0)
S )|S|
Pˆ
(Ω)
B − Pˆ
(0)
S
=
(Pˆ
(Ω)
S − Pˆ
(0)
S )|S|
Pˆ
(Ω)
B − Pˆ
(0)
B + Pˆ
(0)
B − Pˆ
(0)
S
(33)
=
∑
0≤t≤(Ω−1)(1− CS − CB)tCS(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ
(0)
S )|S|
(1−∑0≤t≤(Ω−1)(1− CS − CB)tCB)(Pˆ (0)B − Pˆ (0)S ) (34)
<
∑
0≤t≤(Ω−1)(1− CS)tCS |S|
(1−∑0≤t≤(Ω−1)(1− CS − CB)tCB) (35)
=
(1− (1− CS)Ω)|S|
1− 1−(1−CS−CB)Ω
CS+CB
CB
(36)
≈ CSΩ|S|
1− 1−(1−(CS+CB)Ω+
Ω(Ω−1)
2
(CS+CB)2)
CS+CB
CB
(37)
≈ gΩ
d(S)(1− (Ω− Ω2
2
(CS + CB))CB)
(38)
<
gΩ
d(S)(1− (Ω− Ω2
2
(CS + CB))(CS + CB))
(39)
=
gΩ
d(S)( 1
2
+ 1
2
(Ω(CS + CB)− 1)2)
(40)
≤ 2gΩ
d(S) , (41)
where in Equation 37, we use the first-order and second-
order Taylor expansion on nominator and denominator,
respectively; In Equation 38, we use CS = gV ol(S) , V ol(S) =
d(S)|S|, and Ω(Ω−1)(CS+CB) ≈ Ω2(CS+CB). By setting
Ω = O(log |V |), we have:
nS = O
(g log |V |
d(S)
)
. (42)
